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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
aimed, and to which the defendant's liability should be
limited. A recent case35 has held that protection should be
extended only to harm arising immediately following the
act of the intermeddler, and in the case of a thief only to
his immediate flight.
While no Maryland case deals squarely with the factual
situation under consideration, it is to be noted that in the
instant case the Court uses language in construing the
purpose of the statute which is practically identical with
those cases which have held the owner or operator liable
even though there is an intermeddler who may be a thief,36
saying: "The purpose of Section 192 was either to prevent
some unauthorized person from starting the car or to pre-
vent the starting of the car by gravity. In either case the
object was the protection of the public."37 Such language
could easily suggest that the Court of Appeals would reach
the same result as the Ross and Ostergard cases if a similar
situation should be presented to it. However, the holdings
of the Maryland cases which rejected the idea of a legisla-
tive determined standard of care for establishing negli-
gence as a matter of law," stand as a potential bar to such
a result.
DRAINAGE OF SURFACE WATERS UNDER THE
CIVIL LAW RULE AS APPLIED IN MARYLAND
Bishop v. Richard'
Biberman v. Funkhouser2
In the case of Bishop v. Richard,3 the plaintiff, Richard,
filed a bill in equity to have the defendant, Bishop, enjoined
from interfering in any way with the plaintiff's going on
defendant's land and "cleaning the said ditches in a rea-
sonable and proper manner so that the ditches may be
restored to their former condition in order that they will
8Wannebo v. Gates, 227 Minn. 194, 34 N. W. 2d 695 (1948).
Supra, n. 29.Italics supplied. Supra, n. 1, 783.
See text circa, n. 16, 18 and 19.
165 A. 2d 334 (Md. 1949).
*58 A. 2d 668 (Md. 1948).
* Supra, n. 1. Since the two recent Maryland cases of Bishop V. Richard
and Biberman v. Funkhouser are closely related cases on the problem of
the right of drainage of surface waters under the civil law rule, they are
combined in this casenote for the purpose of discussion of the civil law
rule in Maryland.
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properly operate".4 The general fall of the land and the
natural flow of the surface water, although slight, is from
plaintiff's lands over the lands of defendant, who is the
lower or servient landowner. For a period of about fifty
years, four or five well defined ditches have existed across
the defendant's farm and have drained various portions of
the plaintiff's farm. The ditches on the defendant's farm
have been continued across the plaintiff's property, and
at different times in recent years tile drains have been
installed in the bed of the ditches that are on the plaintiff's
property. The water from the ditches is finally discharged
into a main ditch on the defendant's farm and is carried
into the Choptank River. The plaintiff made several re-
quests of defendant for permission to clean the ditches
which were refused. Then in order to prevent an overflow
of the water, the plaintiff went on the defendant's land
to clean the ditches and he was ordered off by defendant.
The opinion of the Court, in affirming the decree for the
plaintiff, declared that from the facts before the Court, the
increase in the flow of the water in the ditches had not been
substantial as a result of the tiles placed in them by the
plaintiff; and that Maryland had adopted the civil law rule,
wherein the owner of land is entitled to have surface water
flow naturally over the land of the lower or servient land-
owner.
In Biberman v. Funkhouser,5 the plaintiff filed suit to
enjoin the defendant from permitting water and dirt from
his property to drain over and upon the plaintiff's property.
The elevation of the defendant Biberman's lot was origi-
nally higher than plaintiff's. Before any grading was done
on either property the bulk of the water from the defend-
ant's lot naturally flowed over the plaintiff Funkhouser's
lot, and no water flowed onto the defendant's lot at any
point. The Mayor and Council of Hagerstown in regrading
the street in front of the two lots raised the street higher
than the whole of the front part of the plaintiff's lot and
higher than a large part of the front of the defendant's lot.
Plaintiff then filled in his lot, which was about five feet be-
low the street, grading from his house to the street; and as
a result of this grading the front of his lot was raised above
the defendant's lot, causing water to accumulate on the
'The prayer also originally requested that the defendant be enjoined from
filling up or in any manner preventing the ditches on his property from
properly functioning. This relief was not decreed by the lower court
and there was no cross appeal taken by plaintiff, therefore this question was
not before the Court.
. Supra, n. 2.
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corner of the defendant's lot. Then the defendant graded
his lot, thereby causing a bank to be erected along the
plaintiff's property. Before the defendant's property was
graded, the water flowed naturally from the higher ground
in several directions, thereby scattering the drainage; but
after the defendant's lot was graded and put at its present
level, part of the water from defendant's lot flowed onto
the plaintiff's property and part of it flowed into the street.
Before defendant did this grading, there apparently had
been no trouble about water collecting in the plaintiff's
cellar as occurred after defendant's grading. The Court,
in reversing the decree of the lower court granting relief
to the plaintiff, stated that where the upper or dominant
proprietor by regrading had slightly increased the amount
of flow of surface water onto the servient owner's property
with the resulting greater concentration of water, and it
could be remedied by the construction of open drains be-
tween the properties at small cost, the lower owner would
be required to construct the drain on his own land rather
than compel the higher owner to remove an expensive hedge
on his land; but the upper owner, the defendant, would
be required to retard the flow as much as possible by closing
the gullies resulting from the concentration of the waters
due to his regrading.
Two principal rules have grown up as to whether the
lower landowner has the right to create obstructions or,
by regrading his land, repel surface water flowing naturally
from the higher tenement: one is the civil law rule and the
other is the common law rule.' Both the Bishop7 and Biber-
man cases quoted from the Maryland case of Philadelphia,
Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Co. v. Davis,9 where it
was stated by the Court that: "The prevailing doctrine in
this country seems to be that the owner of the upper land
has a right to the uninterrupted flowage of the water caused
by falling rain and melting snow, and that the proprietor
of the lower land, to which the water naturally descends,
has no right to make embankments whereby the current
may be arrested and accumulated on the property of his
neighbor. This is the rule of the civil law apparently
"Actually the -term "common law" rule is a misnomer as England has
always applied the rule of the civil law to surface waters. The common
law theory is also stated as the Massachusetts rule since it was first pro-
pounded by Massachusetts, and the leading case under the common law
rule is Gannon v. Hargadon, 10 Allen 106, 87 Am. Dec. 625 (Mass. 1865),
or as the "common enemy" doctrine, as it was later extended by New Jersey.
7Supra, n. 1, 336, 337.8 Supra, n. 2, 671.
068 Md. 281, 289, 11 A. 822, 824, 6 Am. St. Rep. 440, 442 (1888).
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founded on the principles of justice, and said tobe 'received
with constantly increasing favor in the United States'."' It
has been held that the civil law rule is founded upon and
in accord with the fundamental common law maxim of
watercourses: Aqua currit et debet currere, ut currere
solebat," and because of this descendible nature of water
the dominant land has an easement in the lower tenement
for the natural flow of all waters that arise in, flow onto
or fall upon the upper or dominant land. The theory sup-
porting the civil law rule is that the superior or higher
land originally cost more when it was purchased than the
servient lands did, and that the respective parties purchased
their properties with knowledge of the descendible nature
of water in its natural state. Agricultural states have found
it to be a desirable rule; and as most states are agricultural
states, the civil law doctrine is the majority rule in the
United States.'2
For the purpose of discussion, the common law or "com-
mon enemy" doctrine may be briefly set forth as stated in
American Jurisprudence: "No natural easement or servi-
tude exists in favor of the higher land for the drainage of
surface water; the proprietor of the lower tenement or
estate may at his option lawfully obstruct or hinder the
flow of such water thereon, and in so doing may turn it
back or away from his own lands, and onto and over the
lands of other proprietors without liability by reason of
such obstruction or diversion . . . each landowner may
fight off surface water and dispose of it as best he can."'"
The common law doctrine is based on the belief that surface
waters are a detriment, and thus are to be fought off by
adjoining landowners with impunity as a common enemy.
Also cited by Baltimore & S. P. R. Co. v. Hackett, 87 Md. 224, 39 A.
510 (1898), which was a similar case and holding; Fahnestock v. Feldner,
98 Md. 335, 56 A. 785 (1904); Sentman v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 78 Md. 222,
27 A. 1074 (1893); City Dairy Co. v. Scott, 129 Md. 548, 100 A. 295
(1916) ; and Whitman v. Forney, 181 Md. 652, 31 A. 2d 630 (1943), which
also quoted, in support of the civil law rule, III TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
(3rd Ed.), Sec. 743: "In some states the rule of the civil law has been
adopted, according to which land on which surface water naturally flows
from another tenement is regarded as subject to a servitude of receiving
such flow, and consequently the owner has no right, by any erection or
improvement, to prevent the escape thereon of water from the higher land."
11 Water runs, and ought to run, as it has used to run. See 3 KENT, COMM.
439, and Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407, 67 Am. Dec. 437 (1856).
Shahan v. Brown, 179 Ala. 425, 60 So. 891, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 792 (1913);
Sanguinetti v. Pock, 136 Cal. 466, 69 P. 98, 89 Am. St. Rep. 169 (1902);
Bradbury v. Vandalia Levee and Drainage Dist., 236 Ill. 36, 86 N. R . 163,
19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, 15 Ann. Cas. 904 (1908) ; Greenwood v. Southern
R. Co., 144 N. C. 446, 57 S. E. 157, 119 Am. St. Rep 967 (1907) ; Meixell v.
Morgan, 149 Pa. 415, 24 A. 216, 34 Am. St. Rep. 614 (1892).
u* 56 Am. Jur., Waters, Sec. 69.
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It tends to encourage the landowner to build up or improve
the lower areas; 4 therefore it has been adopted by many
of the large urban states. 15
In strict theory the two rules are directly opposed to
each other, but in almost all jurisdictions the doctrines
have been modified, so that in practice similar results have
been reached in cases in different jurisdictions professing
to follow opposing rules as to the rights and liabilities of
upper and lower landowners in regard to the drainage
of surface waters. The New Hampshire case of Franklin
v. Durgee'6 has not only stated that these doctrines, ad-
vanced for the purpose of determining the liability and
rights of the adjoining landowners, should be modified,
but that in order to do complete justice in such cases in
regard to surface waters neither rule should be adopted
in full. The doctrine of reasonable use, 7 as declared by
that Court, depends solely on the reasonableness of the
lower proprietor's use of his land as compared to the
damage inflicted on the higher land due to the lower owner's
interference with the surface waters. The question of rea-
sonability is a question of fact for the jury. The reasonable
use doctrine, however, is subject to criticism on the grounds
that it is especially desirable in the field of real property
to have certainty in the law, and that certainty in the law
will, in the long run, produce just results.
In its opinion in the Bishop case"8 the Court quoted from
the Maryland case of Whitman v. Forney19 that: "The
adoption of a hard and fast rule under the strict common
law theory would permit the lower landowner to shut off
the natural flow of water on his land, and cause great hard-
ship to the owner of the upper land, and possibility to the
owners of contiguous lands on whom the overflow would
"Upon this theory it has been held that the landowner "may make
erections or excavations thereon to any extent whatever. Within his own
limits, he can control not only the face of the earth, but everything under
it and over it . ..He may erect structures upon his land as high as he
pleases without regard to its effect upon surface water, no matter how
much others are disturbed by it". Morrison v. Bucksport & Bangor Railroad
Co., 67 Me. 353, 355 (1877).
'Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N. Y. 140, 40 Am. Rep. 519 (1881) ; Chadeayne
v. Robinson, 55 Conn. 345, 11 A. 592 (1887) ; Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N. J. L.
351, 86 Am. Dec. 216 (1865) ; Gannon v. Hargadon, 10 Allen 109, 87 Am.
Dec. 625 (Mass. 1865); Boyd v. Conklin, 54 Mich. 583, 20 N. W. 595, 52
Am. Rep. 831 (1884).
h71 N. H. 186, 51 A. 911, 58 L. R. A. 112 (1901).
Minnesota is the only other jurisdiction using this doctrine of reason-
able use, see Note, 2 Minn. L. Rev. 449 RULE AS TO SURFACE WATERS IN
MINNESOTA, (1918).
Supra, n. 1, 337.
181 Md. 652, 659, 31 A. 2d 630, 633 (1943).
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spread. This court has not adopted the common law rule.
As we have shown we have held with the civil law rule
states that the upper landowner has a right to have his
surface water flow in its natural course over the lands of
the lower owner. Yet a strict application of this rule also
might result in very great hardship on the lower land-
owner, who would thereby be prevented from improving
his land or using it as he would otherwise have a right
to use it. In cases where such hardship would necessarily
ensue to one or the other of the owners, courts have some-
times adopted what may be called a 'reasonableness of use'
rule. That rule is based upon the facts in a particular case
and is peculiarly appropriate for an equity court to follow."
The Whitman ° case cites the New Hampshire case of Frank-
lin v. Durgee" in support of this view, but it carefully
points out in the opinion that it does not change the adopted
rule, the civil law rule, creates no precedent, but merely
provides mitigation for the harsh application of the rule
being applied.22 Thus Maryland cannot be said to have
adopted the reasonable use rule, but has merely employed
the doctrine of reasonability where the Court has felt that
the relative hardships on the landowners would be exces-
sive under the strict application of the civil law rule. It is
therefore used in Maryland not as a doctrine of law, but
merely as a qualification of the existing civil law rule which
has been adopted and, with certain qualifications, adhered
to in this State.
The civil law rule is subject to the qualification that
the dominant owner has no right to increase materially
the quantity or volume of water that is discharged on the
Supra, n. 19.
Supra, n. 16.
The Whitman case also quotes at 181 Md. 652, 660, 31 A. 2d 630. 633
from Franklin v. Durgee, 71 N. H. 186, 51 A. 911, 913, (1901), that: "The
result is that the question of reasonableness of the use in a given case
must be determined as a question of fact under all the attendant circum-
stances. The failure to attain substantial justice by the enforcement in all
cases of a rule of law which does not recognize these important differences
is not surprising". And the Whitman case, on the same page, also cites
Noel, Nuisances From Land in its Natural Condition, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 772
(1943), which at 782-784 states: "Where, however, there has been an act
of man which has altered or accelerated the flow of natural surface water
to the plaintiff's land, there has been a tendency to make the question of
liability depend on the doctrine of reasonable user ... In the closely related
matter of the right to obstruct the discharge of surface water, there is a
definite tendency at present to depart from the rigid rules and to adopt
the more flexible doctrine that the lower landowner may prevent the flow
of the surface water if this is done in the ordinary and reasonable use of
his own land . . . A flexible rule would seem similarly desirable for cases
concerned with the upper owner's duty to check the spread of surface waters.
19501
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servient landowner. 3 It is to be noted that in both the
Biberman case24 and the Bishop case25 the court was careful
to point out that the amount of water being cast into the
lands, after the regrading was done or the tiles were placed
in the drains, was comparatively slight. The Biberman
case also stated that another qualification on the rule is
that the upper owner cannot discharge water into an
artificial channel or in a different manner than the usual
and natural course of drainage,26 or put on the lower land
water which would not have flowed there if the natural
drainage conditions had not been disturbed." Therefore
it has been held in Maryland that the upper owner can
accelerate the flow, but he must be careful not to materially
increase the amount or volume by the use of drains and
pipes.28
The rights and liabilities of the upper and lower land-
owners under the civil law rule, in its modified form as it
exists in Maryland, are clearly set forth in several leading
Maryland cases on the problem of the drainage of surface
waters. In the case of Philadelphia, Wilmington & Balti-
more Railroad Co. v. Davis29 the lower owner created an
embankment for the purpose of constructing a railroad,
and in so doing it had closed a gutter, and substituted an
iron pipe. These acts had lessened the capacity of the out-
let for the surface water and as a result the higher land-
owner's cellar was flooded. The Court declared that when
it becomes necessary to create an embankment for any
purpose, it is the duty of the lower proprietor to provide
an outlet of ample capacity to carry off the flow of the
water, for no one can legally assume to alter the condition
of things so as to injuriously affect the pre-existing rights
of his neighbor. It is therefore incumbent on the lower
owner to see that the outlet be skillfully and carefully
constructed, so that no damage will result to the adjoining
landowner; and if done carelessly and negligently, an action
2 Supra, n. 2, 671.
24 Ibid.
IsSupra, n. 1.
20 Johnson v. White, 26 R. I. 207, 58 A. 658, 65 L. R. A. 250 (1904) holds
that this is true even though no more is collected than would have natu-
rally flowed upon the property in a diffused condition.
2 Neubauer v. Overlea Realty Co., 142 Md. 87, 120 A. 69 (1923); III
TIFFANY, REAi PaOPERTY, (3rd Ed. 1939), Sec. 742; and in Dayton v. Ruther-
ford, 128 Il1. 271, 21 N. E. 198 (1889), it was stated that the higher land-
owner had no right to remove or open natural barriers, and let onto the
lower lands such waters as would not have otherwise naturally flowed in
that direction.
21 Neubauer v. Overlea Realty Co., 142 Md. 87, 120 A. 69 (1923).
68 Md. 281, 11 A. 822, 6 Am. St. Rep. 440 (1888).
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for damages may be maintained. ° In effect the Court is
allowing the servient owner to create barriers to the natural
flow of the surface water, in the course of the necessary
use of his land, but he has the burden of also creating a
proper outlet for such waters in order to prevent the upper
landowner from being damaged by the lower owner's use
of his land. In the Biberman31 case this problem arose and
the Court followed this rule by requiring the lower land-
owner to construct a drain on his land providing an outlet
for the surface waters, even though at the time they were
not flowing back onto the upper proprietor's land.
The case of City Dairy Co. v. Scott32 clearly points out
that under the civil law rule the lower owner cannot inter-
rupt the natural flow of the surface water, by filling his lot
or diverting the flow of the drainage, to the detriment of
the higher landowner unless the right to do so has been
acquired by prescription, grant or contract." And that case
further asserts that the servient landowner has the right
to fill his property, if necessary, to protect it from any
unlawful flow of drainage forced upon such lower owner.
Therefore, it is evident that the civil law rule as applied
in the State of Maryland is not strictly a rule for the protec-
tion and benefit of the dominant landowner, but that it
provides rights and liabilities for both the higher and lower
landowners, and neither should violate the rights that the
law thus gives to owners of contiguous estates.
The general principle that the higher landowner cannot
collect surface water and discharge it in a concentrated
volume on the lower land does not apply in the situation
where the water drains through natural depressions or
drains. The weight of authority, on the contrary, holds that
such water may be hastened and incidentally increased by
artificial means so long as its natural flow is not diverted
from these depressions or drainways.34 In fact it has been
declared that the great weight of authority, under both the
civil law and common law doctrines, is to the effect that a
lower owner cannot obstruct the surface water, as against
the rights of the upper owner, from running in such a natu-
ral drainage channel or depression, but such natural drain-
10 Approved in Baltimore & S. P. R. Co. v. Hackett, 87 Md. 224, 39 A. 510
(1898); City Dairy Co. v. Scott, 129 Md. 548, 100 A. 295 (1916); and
Eisenstein v. Annapolis, 177 Md. 222, 9 A. 2d 224 (1939).
Supra, 2.
129 Md. 548, 100 A. 295 (1916).
U See also, 56 Am. Jur., Waters, Sec. 68.5 4Manteufel v. Wetzel, 133 Wis. 619, 114 N. W. 91, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 167
(1907). See, 56 Am. Jur., Waters, Sec. 73, accord.
1950]
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way must be kept open to carry the water into the streams."
Under the civil law rule it has been held that the upper
owner's right of servitude cannot be disturbed by damming
up the natural outlet for the surface waters, even though
no injury might result to the dominant owner;36 and it has
even been held that the mere act of flooding the upper lands
is wrongful per se.37 However, the servient landowner may
use artificial drainage methods so long as it does not inter-
fere with the rights of the upper proprietor as originating
from the natural condition of the land.38
A question arising under the civil law doctrine is
whether the servient owner, if he so desires, can treat sur-
face water as an asset and claim thereby a right to its con-
tinued flow. This question has been answered39 that, "As a
corollary of this civil code, the upper tenant or owner, in
turn, has no right to restrain the surface water from flowing
along their natural way, and hence, any obstruction of the
drainage by the superior heritage is an actionable injury
with respect to the servient estate. This is the strict rule
of the civil law, but it has been abrogated if not completely
nullified by repealing decisions in the same courts holding
the doctrine". Surface water is not regarded by the courts
as an asset, but it is looked upon as a detriment. The ser-
vient proprietor, therefore, has no right to look upon it
as an asset, and he has no vested right in it such as will
enable him to demand that its continued flow be maintained.
In answering the question as to who is to be regarded
as the upper or dominant owner where the level of the
properties have been reversed, the Court in its opinion in
the Biberman ° case declared that the property from which
the water flowed before grading was done on either tract,
as between the adjoining owners of the property, remains
the dominant or upper estate, although the level of the two
properties has subsequently been reversed by the grading.
Thus, the defendant Biberman remained the upper land-
owner, even after the lower owner had regraded his lot so
that it was the higher land; and under the civil law rule
as it exists in Maryland the upper owner could regrade his
81 Am. Jur., Waters, Sec. 75. And in Beechley v. Harms, 332 Ill. 185, 163
N. E. 387 (1928), it was stated that the fact that there is no natural outlet
from the servient land does not relieve it from the servitude placed upon it.
Hooper v. Wolkinson, 15 La. Ann. 497, 77 Am. Dec. 194 (1860).
8 Tootle v. Clifton, 22 Ohio St. 247, 10 Am. Rep. 732 (1871).
Supra, n. 36.
Note, Waters and Watercourses-Diversion and Obstruetion of Surface
Waters, 15 B. U. L. Rev. 892, 896 (1935).
10 Supra, n. 2.
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property to prevent the water from flowing from the origi-
nal lower land onto it so as to protect his natural right
of servitude. But in regrading his land the upper owner
had increased the flow of surface water with resulting
greater concentration than existed under natural condi-
tions, and the Court was correct in requiring him to dimin-
ish the flow as much as possible and to close ditches through
which it flowed. The Court required the plaintiff Funk-
houser to construct a drain on his property, as the amount
of increase in flow was comparatively slight and could be
remedied by the construction of such a drain, rather than
compel the upper owner to remove an expensive hedge.
The Court was justified in this holding by the fact that
it was wrongful for the lower proprietor to interfere with
the dominant owner's natural right of flow over the ser-
vient estate, and because of the relative hardship on the
upper owner if he were required to remove an expensive
hedge, when the lower proprietor could remedy his origi-
nally wrongful act by constructing this drain. The Court
in the Bishop case4' had no difficulty in granting the relief
prayed for by the dominant owner, viz., that he be allowed
to go onto the lower land for the purpose of cleaning out
the drainage ditches, once the Court had decided from the
facts that the placing of the tiles in the ditches on the
dominant land did not materially increase the flow of the
surface water. The Court in its opinion cited and relied on
the case of Whitman v. Forney42 where it was held that the
owners of the lower lands should allow the dominant pro-
prietors to go onto the servient property for the purpose
of repairing and keeping in repair the drainage pipe and
ditch. Therefore the Court in the Bishop case 3 had a similar
case directly in point upon which to base its decision. It is
to be noted that in its decree the Court declared:" "The es-
tablished ditches should be cleaned out in a reasonable and
proper manner in order to facilitate not only the drainage of
appellee's (the upper owner) land but also of appellant's
(the lower or servient owner) land. All debris taken from
the ditches should be removed in such a manner as not to
interfere with the proper cultivation of appellant's land".
This decree by its direct wording and direction to the upper
owner clearly shows that the civil law rule is not merely
for the protection of the upper proprietor or for his benefit
"Supra, n. 1.
181 Md. 652,31 A. 2d 630 (1943).
Supra, n. 1.
Supra, n. 1, 337.
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alone, but that it is for the benefit and protection of both
the dominant landowner and the servient landowner. By
its application both are assured that the rights that have
been given them in regard to the drainage of surface waters
will be protected, and under this civil law rule the adjoining
landowners may determine with reasonable certainty ex-
actly what rights they do possess in reference to the drain-
age of their respective estates.
Under both the civil law and the common law rules, it
is to be noted that there is no liability where water from
natural sources, and without the interference of the hand
of man, accumulates on land and causes harm by spreading
to other land.45 There is only one case that holds that a
landowner is liable for the spread of waters naturally from
his land. 6 Hence the problem of surface waters and the
application of the civil law rule does not arise unless there
is an interference with the natural drainage conditions by
either the dominant or servient owner, or the existing drain-
age system becomes obstructed so that the upper owner is
deprived of his right of drainage over the servient estate.
Two broad questions in all these cases involving surface
waters are: (1) What is the general definition of "surface
waters"; and (2) under the civil law rule is the upper pro-
prietor's right of drainage over the lower lands dependent
upon the law of easements.
Surface waters are such as diffuse themselves over the
surface of the land and follow no defined course or channel.
The distinguishing feature of surface waters, from stream
waters, lakes, and ponds, is their diffused state .4 Generally
they are derived from falling rain or melting snow,48 or
arise in springs which diffuse themselves over the surface
of the ground, "and not gathering into or forming any more
definite body of water than a mere bog or marsh, and are
lost by being diffused over the ground through percolation,
evaporation, or natural drainage".49 Thus waters following
a well defined channel and having a permanent existence
have been held to be a stream, even though dry at times,
and not surface waters which flow intermittingly and
,5 Noel, Nuisances From Land in its Natural Condition, 56 Harvard L. Rev.
772, 782.
Clayton v. Sale Urban Dist. Council, 1 K. B. 415 (1926).
"156 Am. Jur., Waters, Sec. 65.
IsPhiladelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Co. v. Davis, 68 Md. 281,
11 A. 822, 6 Am. St. Rep. 440 (1888). However there is no Maryland case
defining what are considered to be surface waters.
,1 Skinner v. Silver, 158 Ore. 81, 75 P. 2d 21, 28 (1938).
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follow no well defined channel."0 Flood water that leaves
a stream and flows away from the stream was treated as
surface water against which the landower could not de-
fend himself by obstructing its natural flow in an Ala-
bama case,61 but was treated otherwise in California."2
Whether water dripping from the eaves of a roof is surface
water is a point upon which the cases are also in conflict. A
Connecticut case" holds that it is not surface water; where-
as, a Delaware case"4 finds that it is surface water whether
falling on ground or roofs. The Maryland case of Harms
v. Kuchta"5 appears to hold with Connecticut, as the Court
decided that water dripping from a roof to the damage of
an adjoining landowner constitutes a nuisance, and did
not discuss the right of drainage of surface waters in the
opinion. With this conflict between the various jurisdic-
tions, no one definition prevails as to what constitutes
surface waters, each jurisdiction having evolved a working
definition as the need has arisen, with some definitions
which seem to be conflicting possibly being attributable to
the particular facts from which they arose.
As to the second question, it has been expressly held in
Whitman v. Forney6 that under the civil law rule the
upper proprietor's right of drainage over the lower or
servient lands is not dependent upon the law of easements,
but that the right of drainage of surface waters is a natural
right. In that case, the Court held that the plaintiff had a
right to have water from its roadbed run according to its
natural flow across the servient lands of the defendant, and
in the opinion stated: "This is without regard to the ques-
tion of a prescriptive right in an easement across the plain-
tiff's property." 57 The fact that the right of drainage of
surface waters is dependent upon a natural right, as dis-
tinguished from an easement created by prescription, grant,
or necessary implication, is borne out by the Bishop"5 case,
where the ditches had remained for over fifty years and
10International-Great Northern R. Co. v. Regan, 121 Tex. 233, 49 S. W. 2d
414 (1932).
, Nininger v. Norwood, 72 Ala. 277,47 Am. Rep. 412 (1882).
5Horton v. Goodenough, 184 Cal. 451, 194 P. 34 (1920) saying "Any
property owner may protect himself against flood waters running over the
land as they are not surface waters in the technical sense". The different
facts in this case and the Alabama case should be weighed before the cases,
as distinguished from the definitions, are said to be contra.
Shea v. Gavitt, 89 Conn. 359, 94 A. 360 (1915).6 4Bringhurst v. O'Donnell, 14 Del. Ch. 225, 124 A. 795 (1924).
141 Md. 610, 119 A. 454 (1922).
181 Md. 652, 31 A. 2d 630 (1943).
Ibid. at 658.
Supra, 1.
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yet the Court made no reference to the law of easements.
Thus it is sometimes stated that the right of drainage of
surface waters is based on the law of natural easements,
but the term "natural right" is apt to create less confusion
in its usage than the term "natural easement".
STILL FURTHER ON WHETHER A SPENDTHRIFT
TRUST MAY BE REACHED FOR ALIMONY
OR SUPPORT
Hitchins v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
of Baltimore'
This was a dual action, one part of which was a proceed-
ing filed by a surviving trustee in the Circuit Court of
Baltimore City, praying a construction of the will of a cer-
tain testator. By that will the testator created a trust, con-
taining spendthrift provisions as to both corpus and income,
for the benefit of certain designated life tenants. The will
then directed that upon the death of the surviving life
tenant, the trustee should pay the net income to those
grandchildren who were in being at the time of the testa-
tor's death, in equal shares, until such time as the youngest
eligible grandchild should reach the age of twenty-one
years, at which time the trust should terminate and the
property and effects constituting the corpus be sold, the
proceeds therefrom to be divided among the grandchildren
entitled to take under the will. Surviving the testator at
his death, were the designated life tenants and four grand-
children. The appellant, wife of one of the grandchildren
entitled to share under the will, entered into a separation
agreement with him in 1928, whereby he agreed to pay to
her as "permanent alimony" a certain sum, until such time
as the estate of his grandfather should be finally settled
and distributed, at which time he would pay over to her
one-third of the amount distributed to him by the trustee,
upon receipt of which the "permanent alimony" should
cease. Subsequently, the appellant secured a divorce in a
foreign forum. Upon the death of the surviving life tenant,
in 1947, all of the eligible grandchildren were over twenty-
one years of age.
In one proceeding, February 1948, the appellant issued
in the Superior Court of Baltimore City a non-resident
attachment, to which the separation agreement was at-
1 6 A. 2d 93, 97 (Md. 1949).
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